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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4720 
___________ 
 
HUBERT JACKSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
SUPERINTENDENT SOMERSET SCI; GERALD BIGLEY, is sued in his individual 
and official capacity as Judge; JOSEPH M. JAMES, is sued in his individual and official 
capacity as Judge; DONNA JO MCDANIEL, is sued in her individual and official 
capacity as Judge; W. TERRENCE O'BRIEN, is sued in his individual and official 
capacity as Judge 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-01301) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 19, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
2 
 
 Hubert Jackson appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania sua sponte dismissing his civil rights complaint for 
failure to state a claim.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
 In September 2013, Jackson filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that no sentencing orders exist for his state court convictions.  A Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the complaint be dismissed sua sponte, without leave to amend, under 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act for failure to state a claim.  In particular, the Magistrate 
Judge concluded that Jackson’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994), the applicable statute of limitations, and absolute judicial immunity.  Over 
Jackson’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation and dismissed the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  
Jackson appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of 
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Whether a complaint should be dismissed 
under § 1915 because it fails to state a claim is assessed under the same standard as a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Id.  In order to 
survive dismissal under that standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. 
                                                                                                                                                  
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Fairview Township 
v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).   
 Jackson’s cause of action is based on the alleged absence of sentencing orders for 
several convictions.  He claims that he learned that the orders were “non-existent” when 
the Department of Corrections responded to his Right-to-Know Law request by providing 
him with “seven void commitment forms rather than seven lawful court Sentencing 
Orders.”  Notably, though, the docket reports for the criminal cases listed in the 
complaint evidence Jackson’s convictions, and he does not dispute that he pleaded guilty 
and was properly sentenced in those cases.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that 
Jackson’s claim concerning the alleged absence of sentencing orders does not state a 
claim to relief that it plausible on its face.  Cf. Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2014) (stating that “the trial court correctly concluded that, even in the absence 
of a written sentencing order, the [Department of Corrections] had continuing authority to 
detain [Petitioner].”).  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.1  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                              
1 Jackson’s motions for intervention by Chief Judge McKee, his motion to challenge 
appellate jurisdiction, his motion for recusal, his motion to stop deductions of the filing 
fee, and his motion to remand are denied. 
